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The opinion of the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest1 had
at least three institutional addressees: the trial court, the United States Supreme Court, and the California legislature. The case was remanded to the
superior court for trial of a single issue: whether substantial inequality in
school district capacities to tax and spend means inequality of educational
opportunity. While the case was before the trial court, the legislature
made some important changes in California's system of school finance, and a
closely-divided United States Supreme Court responded negatively to Serrano's appreciation of federal constitutional law. In addition to the costquality issue, then, the trial required the parties to confront the questions
raised by the new legislation and by the Supreme Court's decision.
Judge Bernard Jefferson, the trial judge, has now issued a 106-page opinion, ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on virtually every issue that matters. This
article reports on the litigation strategies in the Serrano trial, and on the
trial court's decision. Before turning to the cost-quality issue, I shall take
a few pages to discuss the relevance of the Supreme Court's decision and to
sketch the new legislation.
I
THE RELEVANCE OF RODRIGUEZ

In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,2 the United States
*Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Author's note: I am well acquainted
with some of the counsel for the Serrano plaintiffs, and have watched the case from their side
from the beginning. The resulting spiritual kinship may not constitute an "interest" in the litigation,
but it should be disclosed.
1 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). Much has been written about this
decision. Given the subject of this symposium, I shall assume that the reader is generally familiar
with this literature. For those who need background reading, I suggest beginning with these
articles: Carrington, Financing the American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUm. L. REv.
1227 (1973); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing:A CriticalAnalysis of Serrano v.
Priest and Its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 504 (1972); Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in
Public Education, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1355 (1971). The Carrington article contains an excellent review of the most recent literature, and the Schoettle article discusses the social science literature
at some length. All three of the cited discussions are critical of the Serrano opinion. For a warmer
reception of the decision, see Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities
in the Development of FederalConstitutionalLaw, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 720 (1972). The main line of argument in the Serrano opinion is adopted from J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970), which is doctrinally summarized in Coons, Clune &
Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures,
57 CALIF. L. REV. 305 (1969). An analogous theory was explored at an earlier date in Horowitz

& Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public Education and Public Assistance Programs From Placeto Place Within a State, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 787 (1968). In addition, Frank Michelman
rightly included the school finance problem in his pre-Serrano articulation of a "minimum protection" theory. Michelman, Foreword: Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).

2 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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Supreme Court held that the Texas school finance system, which was similar
to California's, did not violate the United States Constitution's guarantee of the
equal protection of the laws. Finding neither a "suspect classification" nor a
"fundamental interest" to be involved, the Court held that the appropriate
standard of judicial review was not "strict scrutiny," but rather the easily
satisfied "rational basis" standard. The Serrano defendants naturally made
use of the Rodriguez decision, arguing that the decision not only placed the
California school finance system beyond federal constitutional attack, but also
furnished a standard of review for testing the plaintiffs' state constitutional
arguments.
The Serrano decision of the California Supreme Court rested on both
federal and state constitutional grounds; as the court noted, two provisions
of the California constitution are "substantially equivalent" to the federal
equal protection clause. 3 The defendants argued that the Serrano opinion's
conclusions (a) that education is a "fundamental interest" and (b) that wealth
discrimination is a "suspect classification" should be read as predictions of
the course of future Supreme Court decisions, predictions which were shown
by Rodriguez to be mistaken.4 Defendants thus asked the trial court to
make its own prediction as to the California Supreme Court's interpretation
of the state constitution in the light of Rodriguez.
Interestingly, the Serrano plaintiffs were also able to find two causes
for comfort in the Rodriguez opinion:
(1) The Rodriguez opinion agrees with the California Supreme Court's
conclusion in Serrano that a school finance system such as those of Texas
and California "will not pass muster" under a "strict scrutiny" standard of review. 5 Since this proposition of law now has the blessing of both the state
and federal supreme courts, defendants' suggestion 6 that "local control" over
educational spending constitutes a justifying "compelling state interest"
seems futile indeed. The relevance of Rodriguez for the future disposition of the Serrano litigation is therefore limited to the possibility that the
California Supreme Court will abandon its state-law determinations that the
interest in education is fundamental and that wealth discrimination implies
a suspect classification. Since this is the season for predictions, it seems a
safe bet that the California Supreme Court will not relinquish its position of
doctrinal leadership in the area of the "new equal protection,' '7 and that the
"strict scrutiny" standard of review will be retained for state constitutional
litigation in California involving either the fundamental interest in education
or wealth discrimination. The trial court, sharing this view, adopted the
plaintiffs' argument.8
' 5 Cal. 3d at 596 n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11. The adequate state
ground issue is discussed in some detail in Karst, supra note 1, at 743-48.
4 Defendants' Trial Brief at 70-84, Serrano -v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254 (Cal. Super. Ct., Apr.
10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Defendants' Brief]. The two trial briefs filed by the Serrano
plaintiffs are hereinafter cited as Plaintiffs' Brief and Plaintiffs' Reply Brief.
'411 U.S. at 16-17. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 156, 167-69.
6 Defendants' Brief at 84-87.
See Karst, supra note 1, at 721-40.
6 Memorandum Opinion re Intended Decision at 15-33, Serrano v. Priest, Civil No. 938,254
(Cal. Super. Ct., Apr. 10, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Super. Ct. Opinion]. Findings of fact and

CALIFORNIA

(2) Plaintiffs also argued that Rodriguez had specified the kinds of considerations that should control the decision as to what constitutes a fundamental interest, and that the interest of the Serrano plaintiffs met that test.
Plaintiffs principally relied on the California constitution's statement in article IV, section 1 that education is "essential to the preservation of the rights

and liberties of the people." The argument is that this language creates a constitutional right to education, which satisfies the Rodriguez standard for
determining which interests are fundamental. 9 The trial court agreed.' 0
II
THE LEGISLATURE'S RESPONSE

As had been predicted, 1 the Serrano decision freed the legislative
process rather than confining it. Those seeking to equalize school financing
found allies among those who sought to shift the whole revenue system toward lesser reliance on local property taxes and greater reliance on other
taxes. As a result, the sy-stem of school finance was altered in the direction of
heavier contributions from state funds, in an act cheerfully entitled the "Property Tax Relief Act of 1972.112
The 1972 Act retains the basic structure of the pre-Serrano scheme for
financing schools: local taxes on real property are supplemented by state aid
through a "foundation program" aimed at providing a minimum level of support. The new legislation is complex, but two of its features are the most significant for our present purposes: (1) the foundation levels are (roughly)
doubled,13 with provision for their gradual increase, 14 and (2) a gradually
decreasing limit is placed on the revenue which can be raised by a school
district through local property taxation, in the absence of approval of increased rates by the district's voters (a "voted override").1 5 In combination,
these two features will cause school spending by wealthy and poor districts
to converge, provided that the voters of wealthier districts approve no
overrides.
Probably no serious observer would have predicted that the legislature
would, as a first response to Serrano, move directly to a system of fully
conclusions of law are to be issued later.
9 Plaintiffs' Brief at 161-67.
10Super. Ct. Opinion at 33-34.
454 (1970).
S.B. 90, ch. 1406, [1972] Cal. Stats. 2931, as amended, A.B. 1267, ch. 208, [1973] Cal.
Stats. _. These bills' provisions are hereinafter cited by their section numbers in the California
Education Code.
13 CAL. EDUc. CODE §§ 17655.5-17665.5 (West Supp. 1974). Thus the foundation level in
1973-1974 for elementary school districts is raised from $355 per pupil (per "average daily attendance") to $765; iihigh school districts, the level is increased from $488 to $950 per pupil
in ADA. The foundation level is a guaranteed minimum; if a school district levies school taxes
at or above a specified rate, the state will contribute whatever may be needed to bring school funds
up to the foundation level. It is worth noting that this system does not provide equality of school
spending capacity; above the guaranteed minimum level of expenditure a poor district may be
raising revenues that are less than half the revenues which a wealthy district could raise by taxing
at the same rate as the poor district.
141d. § 17301(e).
15
1d. §§ 20902-20909.1.
,J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
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equalized school spending capacity. Certainly it has not done so. It remains
to be determined, however, whether the new finance system is sufficiently
equalizing to pass the constitutional test announced in Serrano. A considerable part of the trial was devoted to that issue. In fact, the trial scarcely resembled an ordinary trial. The issues of fact were issues of "legislative
fact"--the facts relevant to deciding the constitutionality of the legislative
scheme. Some of the testimony was predictive, exploring the probable future
levels of local taxation and- spending under the new law, and particularly the
pace and ultimate timing of the "convergence" envisioned by the law.
The space limitations for this article make it inappropriate to analyze the
details of the "convergence" debate here. Suffice it to say that the estimates of
witnesses 16 varied between nineteen years and nearly thirty years for the length
of time before ultimate convergence of the state's foundation-level contributions
and the limits on revenue produced by local tax rates in the wealthiest districts (always assuming no voted overrides). One question which the trial
court was called upon to answer, then, is whether such a period is too lengthy,
or whether the rights in question are to be treated as "personal and present."' 1
Plaintiffs in Serrano called the trial court's attention to the depressing
analogy of "all deliberate speed" in school desegregation,' 8 and defendants
countered by arguing that (1) the state's good faith is illustrated by the speed
with which the new legislation was passed, and (2) equalization of school
finance capacity cannot be accomplished immediately without creating
"chaos in the schools," in contrast with school desegregation, which "theoretically" could be readily accomplished. 19
The trial court was able to avoid deciding the issue of the timing of "convergence" by recognizing the obvious fact that the things which are to converge under the new law are not the capacities for school spending in rich
and in poor districts; what will converge are: (1) the state's foundation-level
contribution and (2) the amount that a district will be permitted to raise by
property taxation for schools in the absence of a voted override. Since the
wealth disparities among school districts are not affected by the new law,
wealthy districts will still be able to vote to raise school revenues beyond the
foundation levels more easily than can poor districts. 20 If the state's foundation levels were set very high, of course, it would be arguable that school
spending above those levels was inconsequential-or, in doctrinal terms,
that such additional amounts were being spent on something other than
those aspects of education that were "fundamental" in the constitutional
sense. But the fact is that even the newly increased foundation levels are
16 This evidence i summarized and analyzed in Plaintiffs' Brief at 38-52; Defendants' Brief
at 138-45; and Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 68-73.
17 The phrase comes from Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
18 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955). See Plaintiffs' Brief at 51.
19Defendants' Brief at 145. This assessment of the simplicity of school desegregation bears
little resemblance to the experiences of southern school boards in the two decades following
Brown. When desegregation litigation comes to some of the California school districts which are
defendants in Serrano, we can hope that they will remember what they have said here.
20 Super. Ct. Opinion at 71-74.
21 In its Serrano opinion, the California Supreme Court left open the question of the boundaries
of the fundamental interest in education. See the discussion in Karst, supra note 1, at 72425,
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below the present level of per pupil expenditure in the median school district in California. 2 In other words, more than half the districts in the state
will have to continue to use local school taxes in order to keep total per pupil
expenditures at current levels. The districts' capacities to raise these local
revenues continue to be determined by district wealth, with the same discriminatory effects that the California Supreme Court held unconstitutional in
Serrano.
III
LITIGATING THE COST-QUALITY ISSUE

A. Lawyers' Perspectives
Since the question before the California Supreme Court in Serrano was
the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action, the court assumed
the correctness of the plaintiffs' allegation that substantial disparities in
school spending capacity meant inequality of educational opportunity. The
Serrano trial thus promised to be a milestone-a full-scale judicial exploration of the cost-quality issue. The trial produced a 6000-page record and
trial briefs hundreds of pages long.
The Serrano plaintiffs made a deliberate choice not to present social
science testimony on the cost-quality issue in their case in chief, but held
their evidence of this type for rebuttal of defendants' evidence. This tactical choice must have been designed at least in part to emphasize three
arguments aimed at shaping the way the cost-quality issue should be ad23
dressed: (1) the legislature itself had determined the issue in their favor;
(2) the defendants had admitted the correctness of plaintiffs' proposition
as to the relation of cost to quality; 24 and (3) in any case defendants
should have the burden of proving that significant spending-capacity differentials did not imply differentials in educational quality. 25 These arguments, which are potentially dispositive of the cost-quality issue, are obviously variants of familiar forms of lawyers' argumentation. Precisely for
that reason, they may be attractive to judges who may want to avoid setting sail on the treacherous waters of social science. Judge Jefferson did not
allude to these arguments at the outset of his long discussion of the costquality issue, but instead plunged directly into the social science testimony.
Perhaps the judge was of the view that his chief task, as outlined by the
state supreme court, was to make findings of fact on the cost-quality issue,
and not to make further law on the subject. Nonetheless, since similar "lawyers' arguments" may be made in school finance litigation in other states,
733-36. See also text at pp. 338-39 infra.
22 Some 69 per cent of the school districts, serving 85 per cent of the public school children in
California, are currently spending at levels above the 1973-1974 foundation levels. See the summary
in Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 61-62. Although the new legislation provides for annual increases
in the foundation levels at around 7 per cent per year, much of that increase will be eaten away
by inflation, even if inflation can be contained at pre-1973 rates.
23 Plaintiffs' Brief at 64-70; Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 91-93.
24 Plaintiffs' Brief at 71-76; Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 98-99.
25 Plaintiffs' Brief at 76-77.
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they deserve our attention before we, too, embark on those seas.
(1) California's legislature has repeatedly asserted, both directly and by
clear implication, that the amounts of money spent on education bear importantly on educational quality. Both in its general declaration of principles
of the school finance system 26 and in its specific structuring of the details
of that system, 27 the legislature leaves no room for doubting its acceptance of the general 'proposition that the quality of education may 'depend
on the amount of money spent on it. What the Serrano defendants argued was that these legislative declarations are valid only up to the levels
of spending provided by the state's foundation program. Those levels, the
defendants argued, define the cost of an "adequate" education, and variations in spending above those levels do not represent significant variations
in educational quality. 28 The Serrano plaintiffs replied that their complaint alleged inequality of educational opportunity, not total denial of an
adequate education, and they pointed out that the California
Supreme Court
29
had held that such an allegation states a cause of action.
There would be more than a little unreality in an assertion by the plaintiffs that the legislature had concluded that its own scheme of school finance, so recently adopted, 'was invalid. But plaintiffs made a more limited
argument: that the legislature has recognized the relation between cost
ahd quality, not only up to the state's foundation levels of support, but also
albove those levels. Since the California school finance system is designed
specifically to permit spending above those levels, both by the state and
by- local districts, 30 presumably the legislature assumes that something
will be achieved by this additional spending. Indeed, it is hard to see any
purpose to be achieved by this spending other than increased educational
quality.
At some high level of state support, of course, the argument of the Serrano
defendants must become valid. If the state should decide to support
all school districts at the level at which the wealthiest district is now
spending, and to provide for regular future increases in state support
commensurate with past increases in wealthy district spending, then surely
variations in spending above the state support level would not be unconstitutional under the California Supreme Court's Serrano opinion. The
reason, however, would not be that such spending variations did not produce inequality of educational opportunity; it would be, instead, that the
remaining inequalities either were de minimis or related to aspects of education that lie outside the "fundamental" interest in education. 31 Perhaps
the defendants should be understood to make the latter argument in the
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17300 (West 1969).
27 Examples of such structuring include the foundation program itself, which is protected
26

against inflation, the limitations of class size, and various programs of special and compensatory
education. See Plaintiffs' Brief at 66-69.
28 Defendants' Brief at 172-75.
29 Plaintiffs' Brief at 93-94.
'0 California school districts are authorized to vote overrides to provide support for schools
above the foundation levels. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 20906 (West Supp. 1974).
31 See text at p. 344 infra.
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context of the present foundation levels. If so, they were betrayed by the
testimony of their own witnesses, those representatives of wealthy districts
who asserted with great vigor that they could not cut back their
spending
32
to present foundation levels without suffering educational disaster.
(2) Since many of these witnesses are either defendants or representatives of defendants in the Serrano litigation itself, their enthusiastic affirmance of the relationship between cost and quality-the very proposition plaintiffs sought to establish-may seem curious. In fact, however,
this irony is built into school finance litigation wherever it may arise. The
"haves"-those who are favored by the state's system for collecting taxes
and distributing public funds-must argue that they will suffer harm if they
are deprived of their preferred status, and at the same time argue that those
who are not so favored have suffered no relative disadvantage. The
Serrano plaintiffs quite naturally have spotlighted this built-in inconsistency, and the defendants have been embarrassed by it.
(3) The plaintiffs' burden-of-proof argument may seem on first glance to
be a bit of lawyers' maneuvering. Defendants merely dismissed this argument as a curiosity, having misunderstood it as no more than a repetition of argument (1) above. 33 What plaintiffs argued in addition was
that the legislature's declarations as to the relation of cost to quality
should at least be taken as establishing a prima facie case for the validity
of plaintiffs' assertions of that relation.
The same conclusion-that defendants have the burden of proving that
substantial cost inequalities do not produce inequalities of educational
quality--can rest on another basis, which relies not on legislative determinations but on the common understanding of participants in a market economy. 34 Insofar as the defendants' "local control" argument has relevance to
levels of school spending, it is control over the allocation of money that
nTatters. Even a state which financed schools entirely out of state funds might
reasonably choose to make allocations to its school districts in money rather
than goods and services in kind. The natural assumption in such a system,
by both state officials and district officials, would be that since it is the availability of money that provides choice in a market system, increases in the
money so dispensed would provide more choice (more "local control")
to school districts-and thus more opportunity to provide high-quality ed32 Defendants persuasively argued that there is a great difference between the serious and perhaps irremediable effects of cutting back a going program in a wealthy district (which involves
disruption of existing educational operations and the breaking of commitments to teachers,
suppliers, and so forth) and adding to a poor district's program (which offers only a chance to
achieve certain educational effects). Since all the Serrano plaintiffs seek is an equalization of the
capacity to spend for the purpose of trying to achieve educational effects, it is hard to see how this
argument of defendants does more than reinforce plaintiffs' position. Wealthy school districts
(defendants here) argue: don't take away the educational benefits we have achieved with money
merely on the speculation that poorer districts will also be able to achieve the same kinds of educational benefits with money. It is always painful for the "haves" to be required to share with the
"have-nots." While that is a political argument that has prevailed throughout the pre-Serrano
era, it is scarcely an argument addressed to the cost-quality issue.
33 Defendants' Brief at 173-74.
U See Karst, supra.note 1, at 749-52.
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ucation. The idea that money equals capacity in a market is not an exceptionally subtle idea; it is grasped readily by budget-makers and wageearners the world over. True, some budget-makers spend their allocated
funds unwisely, just as some wage-earners consume too much poker and gin.
But the Serrano plaintiffs have sought only to equalize the capacities of
35
school districts to offer high educational quality. If "local control" means
giving a district a real choice of tools for achieving such an offeringas distinguished from a mask for privilege-then it is this capacity which is
the critical factor. It is not strange, then, that courts have regularly assumed
that inequality as to allocations of resources to schools implies inequality
36
of educational opportunity, and requires justification. This shifting of the
burden of proof is not a lawyer's trick, but a sensible recognition of the role
of money in the market of educational goods and services.
B. The Limitations of Social Science
The Serrano trial produced volumes of expert social science testimony
about the cost-quality issue. The result should be heartening to those who
have feared the imminent take-over of society by practitioners of the behavioral sciences. The Serrano trial illustrates one great strength and one
weakness of those social science professionals who dwell in the world of
models and statistical analysis. The strength lies in the sophistication of
techniques for analyzing "the data." The weakness lies in the very process
of model-building. In order to be reduced to statistical analysis, facts must
be refined and abstracted, with the danger that our perceptions of reality
will be seriously distorted by this inevitable selection process. The word
"data" is Latin for "given"; we must always remember that "the data" represent someone's assumption of what is given, someone's choice of what
should be measured.
When plaintiffs say that inequality of "inputs"--the things money can
buy-means inequality of educational opportunity, it is fair for defendants
to accuse them of being "simplistic." 37 And when defendants say that inequality of educational opportunity is to be measured by "outputs"-- achievement scores on standardized tests in a few subject areas-it is fair for plaintiffs to criticize this measure as "limited" and "inadequate.1 38 Both accu-

3' Defendants' characterization of plaintiffs' argument as one calling for uniform spending,
Defendants' Brief at 177, is simply mistaken. Plaintiffs content that wealth-based inequality of schoolspending capacity is unconstitutional, since it is not needed to serve a compelling state interest.
Other kinds of differential spending would raise different isues. If all districts had the same fiscal
capacity, and some chose to tax less and spend less on schools, then the courts might have to face
the question whether the children in those lower-spending districts were being denied a constitutional
right to equal spending. That is not this case. Furthermore, differential spending may be justified-may serve a compelling state interest-if it is aimed at compensatory education or other special
educational needs. That also is not this case.
36 See, e.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 327 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., sitting as District
Court Judge).
37 Defendants' Brief at 177. The accusation is not so fair if we perceive the cost-quality issue
to be a question of law rather than a question of legislative fact. Plaintiffs' argument that the
legislature has determined the cost-quality issue is a legal argument, not a factual assertion.
38 Plaintiffs' Brief at 115, 117.

CALIFORNIA

sations are fair, for any statement about so vast and complex a phenomenon
as education must necessarily be oversimplified. Any analysis requires abstraction and selection. Because we have nothing like an adequate model
of the educational process, either we cannot now measure educational opportunity at all, or we must measure it with crude instruments. Since
abdication was ruled out by the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Serrano, the trial court had to decide whether "inputs" or "outputs" was
the more appropriate measure.
Plaintiffs' effort to summarize their position by saying that "outputs are
an inappropriate measure of educational opportunity"' 3 9 is too broadly
phrased. If we really could accurately measure the output of a school, it
would be silly to look anywhere else to determine the quality of the education offered by that school. In the sense in which I am now using the term,
"output" and education are the same thing. What plaintiffs argued was a far
narrower proposition: that achievement on standardized tests is an inaccurate
measure of educational output, both because these tests measure performance in only a small portion of a student's education and because the
tests are inadequate to measure students' educational attainments in the
40
areas which they do cover.

In reply, defendants made an argument that is a once-removed cousin of
the plaintiffs' burden-of-proof argument: 4 1 (1) The "fundamental" interest
which triggers strict judicial scrutiny, defendants say, is the interest in education. (2) Therefore, if plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that unequal
spending produces unequal education, they are not entitled to a strict scrutiny
standard of review, for they are arguing only about money and not about
education. (3) "Education" means educational output. (4) The only output
measure we have consists of achievement scores on standardized tests, and
these scores show only an insignificant positive correlation with school
spending. 42 (5) If these tests are inadequate to measure educational output
(and defendants conceded that they were), then there is no way to prove that
unequal spending produces inequality of educational opportunity, and plaintiffs
must wait until social science comes up with better ways to measure output before asking for strict judicial scrutiny of unequal spending. In the
meantime, all the state need show is a rational basis for the current school
spending pattern.
Perhaps the most significant part of this line of argument is the Serrano
defendants' admission that achievement tests
39Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 106.
40 Plaintiffs' Brief at 109-36. That truncated statement in the text is wholly inadequate to convey
the richness of this long and careful portion of the plaintiffs' brief, which is a model of lawyers'
analysis of social science. See also McDermott & Klein, Cost-Quality Debate in School Finance Litigation:Do DollarsMake a Difference?, 38 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 415 (1974).
41 Defendants' Brief at 172-204.
42 There was a lot of testimony on this question. Plaintiffs dispute the defendants' conclusion
that achievement scores do not support plaintiffs' position on the cost-quality issue. In particular,
plaintiffs offered testimony concerning two longitudinal studies of the cost-quality relationship,
made in certain California public schools. These studies dispute the now-conventional social
science wisdom, as represented by J. COLEMAN, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966).
See Plaintiffs' Brief at 137-49.
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do not measure all the goals of education nor do they measure all the benefits
or detriments a child may receive from his educational experiences. Also, defendants agree that the state of the art of measuring educational effectiveness
is in its infancy and provides at this time and on this record, an inadequate basis
for judicial determination of the effect of varying expenditure levels and assessed
valuations on the quality of education as measured
by the only common statewide
43
method available-pupil achievement scores.
Defendants thus relied primarily on their own version of a burden-of-proof
argument: since achievement testing is the best anyone can presently do
in measuring educational quality, and since plaintiffs have not demonstrated
that unequal spending produces unequal test scores, plaintiffs' case fails.
The irony of this state of the case is worthy of the great ironic traditions
of constitutional law. The Serrano trial had been nationally billed as a judicial proving ground for social science arguments about the cost-quality
issue. Yet the parties on both sides ultimately urged the court to discount
the social science evidence, and to fall back on such familiar lawyers' devices as admissions and the burden of proof. Such an approach to decision,
far from being surprising, is invited by modern equal protection doctrine,
where the law's predispositions are enshrined in competing standards of review: "rational basis" and "strict scrutiny."
The trial court's discussion of the cost-quality issue occupied a major
portion of the opinion. 4 4 After reviewing much of the social science testimony, the court agreed with the parties' assessment of the state of the art:
This court is convinced, from the evidence introduced in this case, that the statistical correlational research methods employed in social science or educational
research have not-reached that degree of reliability that it can be said with any
degree of certainty as to the precise part which the various factors of home, school
or genetics play separately upon pupil achievement in the standardized reading,
mathematics, language, or other achievement-measurement tests. 45

Despite this lack of confidence, the court was
convinced from the evidence that a school district's per-pupil expenditure
level does play a significant role in determining whether pupils are receiving
a low-quality or a high-quality educational program as measured by pupil
46
test-score results on the standardized achievement tests.

This conclusion was taken partly from a statement by the Office of Program
Evaluation of the California State Department of Education that high achievement-test scores were associated with high expenditures per pupil, and partly
from the testimony of school district officials (including representatives of
the defendant high-wealth districts) as to the importance of school spending in providing high quality education. 47
Even more significant was the court's refusal "to accept a definition
of the quality of an educational program that is made to depend solely upon
'3Defendants' Brief at 184.
44 Super. Ct. Opinion at 74-101.
45

Id.at 89.

461d.
4

1Id.at 89-90.
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pupil performance on these standardized achievement tests... .,, School
district offerings-the inputs that money can buy-were found to be a more
appropriate measure of educational quality. In particular, the court emphasized those inputs which affect
(1) varying class size; (2) teacher quality; (3) curricular offerings; (4) length
of school day; (5) adequacy of materials and equipment; and (6) variations in
supportive services such as the number of counselors, the training of counselors,
the number49 of teacher aides and the type of maintenance of buildings and
equipment.
In reaching this conclusion, too, the court relied heavily on the testimony of
public education officials, including the superintendents of both low-wealth
and high-wealth districts.
Both of the trial court's major findings as to the cost-quality issue thus
rested not so much on the testimony of social scientists as on the testimony
of school district superintendents-and especially those who represented the
defendant high-wealth districts. Without speaking directly to the plaintiffs'
argument that defendants had admitted that educational quality depended on
school spending, the court accepted that argument in substance. Since
school district offerings would continue to be a function of district wealth
even under the new legislation, the court was able to find that50"plaintiffs
have established the truth of the allegations of their complaint....
Even assuming that plaintiffs have carried their burden of proof on the
cost-quality issue, a major question remains. Defendants contended that the
inequalities, if any, caused by differential school spending did not affect
the fundamental interest in education. To hold for the plaintiffs, it was necessary for the trial court to respond to this contention. We thus turn to the
question: what aspects of educational spending can be called fundamental?

IV
THE FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN EDUCATION

One of the bases for the California Supreme Court's Serrano opinion
was its conclusion that education is a fundamental interest. What the- court
left unresolved was the content of the fundamental interest in education.
The Serrano defendants argued that once the state is providing an "adequate" level of financial support for schools, any additional inequalities
in local school spending capacity relate to something other than the fundamental interest in education. They further argued that the newly increased
state support levels under the foundation program are sufficient to provide
an "adequate" education.-"
The defendants' approach to defining what is fundamental about education, it will be seen, does not involve the court in sorting through the
4

sId. at 94.
1d. at 95.
1d. at 101.
51Defendants' Brief at 172-76, 182-83. As the trial court noted, Super. Ct. Opinion at 57,
defendants' argument is supported as to the federal equal protection clause by San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
4
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myriad features of the educational process in order to pick out the fundamental ones. That is a task that would horrify any judge-well, almost any
judge. Even selecting a level of school financing that is "adequate" is a
troublesome task for a court. A judge's natural inclination would be to defer
to the legislature's determination as to the adequacy of support-and this
despite the admitted fact that in 1972 the California legislature made no
such determination at all. It first set a total amount of money that was "available" for the state's contribution to education, and then worked52 backward
from that gross figure to the foundation levels ultimately adopted.
The Serrano plaintiffs agreed that the court should not try to pick out
fragmentary inputs into the educational process and label them "fundamental," but should instead concern itself with dollars as the key input.
However, they argued, the constitutional issue does not turn on the
"adequacy" of state support for education, in some absolute sense, but on
"whether the foundation program is so high that districts will not choose to
'53
exceed it, so that wealth-related expenditure differences will not occur.
The only truly adequate foundation program, in this view, would be one in
which the state supported what the plaintiffs called "quality" educational
programs. By this they meant the sort of education that is now being provided in the high-spending districts, and their best support in the record came
from the testimony of defendants' own witnesses from wealthy districts
54
testifying as to the minimum levels they would find adequate.
The issue as defined by the California Supreme Court's opinion in
Serrano is, of course, neither "adequacy" nor "quality"; it is inequality.
The trial court readily agreed with this characterization of the issue. 5 Plaintiffs' "quality" argument was in fact a restatement of the inequality point
quoted above, with perhaps a recognition that beyond some high level of equalized spending capacity, wealth-related inequalities in spending can be treated
as de minimis. To put this issue once again in doctrinal terms, the question is
whether those inequalities in spending capacity which persist between the minimum presently assured by the state and the levels at which "qtuality" education
is being financed in the wealthier districts are inequalities as to a "fundamental" aspect of education. The answer to this question, it seems to me,
has to be affirmative. To say otherwise would be to say that the wealthy
districts, which spend nearly twice as much per pupil as the amounts of
the new foundation levels, are spending nearly half their budgets on goods
and services that are educationally insignificant.
A respectable argument has been made to the effect that the judiciary
should approach the problem of wealth discrimination not so much with
the idea of ending relative deprivations as with the idea of assuring the
satisfaction of everyone's essential needs.5 6 But the author of this "minimum
-1 See Plaintiffs' Brief at 66-67.
53Id. at 61.
54The cost range suggested by these witnesses for "adequate" educational quality was in the
area of $1400-1600 per pupil per year. See id. at 32-34. The new foundation levels are in the area
of $765 per pupil for elementary districts and $950 per pupil for high school districts.
55Super. Ct. Opinion at 58-60.
56 Michelman, supra note 1.
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protection" theory has noted that in education, "the minimum is significantly
a function of the maximum.15 7 In other words, as the California Supreme
Court said in Serrano, education is fundamental largely because of its
importance for achievement in a competitive society. For this reason, in
education it is precisely relative deprivation that matters, and not merely
a minimal "adequacy." The voters and school officials in both wealthy and
poor school districts understand this point very well, the trial court accepted
it, and it will not be surprising if the California appellate courts continue to
accept it.
Certainly it is true that our notions of what is "fundamental" in education will change as times change. A growth in the general level of affluence
will be reflected in an expanded definition of what is a part of "quality" education. Correspondingly, any constitutional obligation on the part of the
state to support education must surely be limited by what the state can afford. The Serrano defendants so argued, and the argument is undeniably
sound. But the defendants seem to be assuming that the constitutional
right asserted by the plaintiffs is a right to some (rather high) minimum level
of state support for the schools. The plaintiffs' argument was, however, very
different; it was an argument based on inequalities of school spending
capacity. The California constitution need not be interpreted to require any
particular level of state spending on schools. 58 But if the legislature chooses
to organize its taxing and spending system to pi-oduce substantial wealthbased inequalities of school spending capacity, then those inequalities will
be constitutional only to the extent that they can be confined to spending
beyond the aspects of education that are fundamental. It seems inconceivable
that the California Supreme Court would abandon this carefully articulated position.
V
THE PROBLEM OF REMEDY

In their complaint, the Serrano plaintiffs had asked not merely for a
declaratory judgment that the California school finance system is unconstitutional, but also for an order that the defendants (including state school
officials) reallocate school funds in order to bring the system within constitutional bounds. Furthermore, if the defendants and the legislature did
not so restructure the system, the plaintiffs asked the court to formulate
its own plan for collecting and allocating school funds. The plaintiffs no
doubt wanted to suggest 'that the judiciary had a number of instrumentg at
hand, of varying degrees of delicacy, to be applied as might prove necessary.
The more draconian forms of possible relief will almost certainly never be
57

d. at 58.
11 Super. Ct. Opinion at 60. We might expect the courts to adopt a position such as this in the
unlikely event that the state should drastically reduce its support for public education (including
those forms of state support that are channeled through local governments' power to tax and
spend). If the state were to go out of the education business altogether, for example, the resulting
de facto wealth discrimination in education might well be unconstitutional. See Karst, supra note
1, at 733-36; Michelman, supra note 1, at 47-59. No such heroic issue faces the courts in Serrano.
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appropriate, but plaintiffs cannot be faulted for keeping them in reserve.
Compared with their complaint, plaintiffs' prayer for relief at the conclusion of the Serrano trial was modest. 59 They asked primarily for a declaratory judgment that the school finance system continues to violate the
California constitution. More specifically, they sought a declaration that
one unconstitutional feature of the system is its continued authorization of
voted overrides by wealthier districts. 60 Secondly, they asked for an injdnction forbidding such voted overrides in defendant districts. 61 Such a
declaration or injunction would limit school spending inequalities to the
gradually diminishing differences between the state foundation levels and
district revenue limits during the period of "convergence." Plaintiffs, however, added this conciliatory remark:
Plaintiffs do not wish to overemphasize the prayer for injunctive relief, however.
Defendants are governmental entities and public officials, and there is no
reason to conclude that they will not conform
their conduct to the terms of a de62
claratory judgment issued by this Court.

Even the requested limited injunctive relief, it seems, was to be kept as a
reserve weapon to be used only if the legislature does not properly respond
to a declaratory judgment of unconstitutionality. What the plaintiffs chiefly
wanted at this stage was a declaration that wealthy district voted overrides
are unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs got their wish, and more. The trial court declared the following provisions of the California school finance system unconstitutional:
'9Plaintiffs' Brief at 170-75.
60 Plaintiffs' suggested two alternative formulas, both using existing statutory language, for
identifying these wealthier districts. One related to the entitlement to an inflation adjustment
allowed for revenue limits, and the other related to a district's qualification for "equalization
aid"--the aid that guarantees funds at the foundation levels. Either formula would be arbitrary,
denying substantial sums of money to a district just above the chosen line. However, the injunctive
remedy would surely be of short duration, given the near-certainty of a quick response by the
legislature. The legislature might even be given a set period of time between a declaration that
wealthy district voted overrides are unconstitutional and the effective date of an order enjoining
such overrides.
61Plaintiffs also suggested another possible limited form of injunctive relief, restraining the
payment by the state of "basic aid"--$125 per pupil paid annually to all districts, but applied against
the foundation levels. "Basic aid" is essentially a subsidy to the wealthier districts. See Plaintiffs'

Brief at 173-74; Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional
Test for State FinancialStructures, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 305, 315 (1969). The trial court, responding

to this argument of the plaintiffs, held that "basic aid" to high-wealth districts was unconstitutional.
Super. Ct. Opinion at 102. However, no injunctive relief was ordered at this time.
In an amicus brief for the Childhood and Government Project of the Earl Warren Legal
Institute at the University of California at Berkeley, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers,
and the California Congress of Parents and Teachers, Inc., John E. Coons, Robert H. Mnookin,
and Stephen D. Sugarman suggest that the court might also specify that two sections of the Education Code are invalid, in the event that the legislature should fail to adopt a constitutional finance
system within a reasonable time. The sections (20905 and 20906) allow some districts to have
"revenue limits" above the foundation levels, and to vote overrides above their revenue limits.
The result of this relief would be to cut school spending in California back to the foundation
levels, permitting the legislature to authorize school spending above these levels only if wealthbased inequalities of spending capacity were eliminated. As the text at note 63 infra indicates,
the trial court did hold that voted overrides are unconstitutional. Super. Ct. Opinion at 102.
62 Plaintiffs' Reply Brief at 117.
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(1) the basic aid payments of $125 per pupil to the high-wealth school district; (2) the right of voters of each school district to vote tax overrides and
raise unlimited revenues at their discretion; (3) disparities between school districts in per-pupil expenditures, apart from the categorical aids special-needs
programs, that do not reduce to insignificant differences, which means amounts
considerably less than $100 per pupil, within a maximum period of six years;
and (4) variations in tax rates between school
districts that are not reduced to
63
nonsubstantial variations within [six years].
In choosing the six-year period, the court noted that equalization of per

pupil expenditures4 ought to be "achieved at a pace faster than that of all due
6

deliberate speed."
Part (3) of the court's declaration seems on its face to bar the legislature from using any system of school finance that results in differential
school spending from district to district, even differences that are not based
on district wealth. Taken literally, this portion of the opinion would hold
"district power equalizing" 65 unconstitutional. Elsewhere, however, the
court suggests this very scheme as one possible legislative response that
would be upheld.6 6 The Serrano opinion of the California Supreme Court
made clear that it is wealth-based inequality that is at the heart of the
school finance system's constitutional defect; perhaps there will be a modification of the trial court's opinion to clarify this point.
The court issued no injunctive order, but retained jurisdiction to permit
the parties to apply for '"appropriate relief" in the event that the legislature or other governmental bodies do not create a constitutional school
finance system "within a reasonable time."67 The court did hot
specify what length of time might be reasonable. In the Rodriguez case
the lower court had declared the Texas school finance system unconstitutional,
and had stayed its mandate for two years to permit the legislature to enact
a valid system. It has been argued that the lower court's order in the Rodriguez case created a risk that the Texas legislature might not respond
favorably within the period set by the court, thus setting the stage for a confrontation between court and legislature. 68s In Rodriguez, the order provided that, in such event, the state school officials should reallocate school
funds in conformity with constitutional demands. The reserve weapon thus
laid on the table was indeed a bludgeon, and perhaps an ineffective one at
Super. Ct. Opinion at 192-03.
Id. at 103.
65 This proposal would permit a school district to spend at any desired level, by adopting
a school tax rate pegged to the spending level selected. The higher the tax rate, in other words,
the higher would be the permitted school spending. However, spending would not be tied to the
63
64

amount of revenues collected, but to an amount determined by the tax rate selected. The state would
"recapture" the revenues raised in excess of those necessary for the predetermined spending

level and distribute them (along with state funds, if necessary) to poorer districts whose tax rates
did not raise sufficient revenue to meet the predetermined spending levels corresponding to
the rates selected by those districts. See J. CooNs, W.' CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH
201-42 (1970).
66
Super. Ct. Opinion at 102.
67
Id. at 106.
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68 Carrington, supra note 1, at 1253.
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that, given the limited authority of state officials over school funds raised

locally.

69

In the context of Serrano, however, it might be argued that the California
legislature already has shown itself to be responsive; the 1972 Act was adopted
in a bipartisan atmosphere,70 before anyjudidal order had been entered against
ny defendant. The trouble with such an argument is that much of the political
momentum of 1972 was spent in the 1972 Act itself Despite the Serrano
plaintiffs' expression of optimism, there is no reason to assume that the California legislature will do anything whatever in response to a declaratory judgment, even one that has been affirmed .by the state supreme court: Is the
California prospect then one of stalemate?
The main justification for a more optimistic prediction lies in the 1972
legislation itself, which gave the California courts a convenient handle on the
school finance system. Under the new law, the state's foundation program
contributions to poor districts will be regularly increasing, and the levels of
permissible wealthy district school' taxation will be steadily decreasing. The
law thus contemplates the ultimate "convergence" of school spending by wealthy
and poor districts-assuming no voted overrides in wealthy districts. The
courts can, by the simple expedient of enjoining voted overrides, assure the
eventual (although delayed) equalization of school spending.
By specifying the unconstitutionality of such features of the California
system as basic aid and voted overrides, the Serrano trial court has narrowed
the focus of its decision. If the court should find it necessary to grant injunctive
relief against the payment 6f basic aid and the vptinj of tax overrides by highwealth districts, such an order will be more limited (and more "judicial"seeming) than was the order of the lower court in Rodrgiez. Such injunctive
relief would not involve the court in the constitutionally dubious process of
drawing up its own system of taxation and 9chool spending. Nor would such
an ofder require anything of the defendant state officials that was beyond their
control. It would, however, virtually assure a prompt response by the legislature, since the representatives of wealthier districts would have a pressing
reason to join with those of poorer districts in fashioning a school finance
system to meet constitutional requirements.
Short of moving to a system of exclusively state-level financing of public
education, the legislature can eliminate wealth-based inequality in the system
in one of two ways. (1) State foundation levels can be radically increased, to
the point that any additional school spending could properly be called de
minimis or said to be unrelated to the "fundamental" interest in education.
It bears emphasis that the new foundation levels, to pass this constitutional test,
would have to be roughly equal to present spending by the wealthiest districts,
with provision for their increase at rates commensurate with past rates of increase in such districts. (2) The legislature can maintain the same foundation
levels, but move to a wealth-free system of local taxation and spending above
those levels. "District power equalizing" is only one possible formula for such
69 Id.

'0 The bill came to be known as the "Reagan-Moretti Bill," after the state's Republican Governor and the Democratic Speaker of the Assembly.
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a legislative response, and not the most likely one at that.7 1
Neither the Serrano plaintiffs, the trial court, nor others (so far as I know)
suggest that the state must move to a rigid system in which exactly the same
amount is spent on each school child. There is room in the Serrano opinions
of both the California Supreme Court and the trial court for all sorts of differential spending justified by programs of compensatory education, experimental programs, increased appropriation to districts with a problem of
"municipal overburden"!-indeed, any inequalities that serve compelling state
interests, including "local control."72 What is constitutionally forbidden in
California-Rodriguez notwithstanding-is the substantial wealth-based inequality in school spending capacity that persists even under the 1972 Act.
7' Another response, one variant of which has been articulated by the authors of district
power equalizing, would be a voucher system. See, e.g., Coons & Sugarman, Family Choice in Education: A Model State System for Vouchers, 59 CAUF. L. REv. 321 (1971). The chief practical objection to the adoption of district power equalizing is the difficulty of predicting the state's annual
obligation to support education. Despite this difficulty, Edmund G. Brown, Jr., .the Democratic
candidate for Governor in the November 1974 election, has spoken approvingly of district
power equalizing as a means of complying with Judge Jefferson's Serrano decision. Brown's
Republican opponent, Houston I. Flournoy, proposes compliance with the decision by combining
a statewide property tax with other financing from the state's general fund. It is noteworthy
that both candidates anticipate not defiance of the courts, but a good-faith effort at legislative
compliance with the decision. See Los Angeles Times, June 2, 1974, § IX, at 3, col. 1.
72 Thus it would be permissible, within the constitutional limits set by Serrano, for the state
to permit local districts to choose to tax at lower rates, thereby supporting their schools at lower
levels, provided that the districts had equal capacity to make such choices. Despite the Serrano
trial court's language in part (3) of its declaration of unconstitutionality, see notes 65-66 supra,
it seems unlikely that the court wished to invalidate inequalities in school spending that were not
the result of wealth-based inequalities in spending capacity.

